I AM NOT DE LIMA AND SHE IS NOT EVERY WOMAN

Senator Leila de Lima used her powers as Secretary of Justice to accomplish the very things she was supposed to stop, all for her personal ambition. She made the already entrenched drug trade proliferate further. She created and empowered drug lords in the National Penitentiary which became the main office of the country's illegal drugs industry. She created more drug addicts by letting loose more drugs in the market. The welfare of the nation was far from her mind. She had an affair with a much-younger married man - her driver over whom she exercised moral ascendancy- and made him her tool to raise money from drugs for herself. She aggravated corruption in the National Penitentiary.

I have to agree now with the President: De Lima was screwing her driver while screwing the whole nation. The two are related. Before, I ranted twice on Facebook that her private life was not an issue. I was wrong. It was an issue. It is.

This war on drugs became necessary because of her. The blood of the innocent casualties are on her hands, too.

As a woman, I am incensed that she keeps using the picture of the oppressed woman as a trump card. She was an oppressor. She continues to be one. No, de Lima, I am not you. My sisters are not you. My mother is not you. My aunts are not you. My daughters are not you. My nieces are not you.

You are not every woman. You are this country's biggest narco-politician who happens to be biologically a woman.

You are sui generis, a class all of your own. Don't make us into your image.

KISSACK, YOU ARE GONE. LONG YOU WILL LIVE.

Last night, we paid tribute to a fine young man who has gone to the West: Atty. Kissack Batong Gabaen. He was known for his staunch defense of human rights especially of indigenous peoples. People came from as far as Palawan to express admiration for this great man. Yes, he had personal flaws, but no one can question his track record as an activist and his dedication to stand up for the marginalized and oppressed and to fight for justice.

In his lifetime, I was blessed to have him as a brother, friend, and comrade all rolled into one. We handled human rights cases together. We participated in the human rights education of communities together. He counted me as one of his mentors. During our two last speaking engagements as a team, one in the Benguet State University and another before a community in Ifugao, he publicly acknowledged me as his mentor. On both occasions, I thanked him for the honorable attribution which I found humbling. But actually, I am now his mentee. His life of service to the people is worth drawing inspiration from.

The last time we saw him conscious was on June 28. I told him jokingly, "Kissack, NUPL-National has a meeting today and I committed to be there (This was true.). But today, something was telling me this might be my last time to see you like this so I chose to be with you and asked Edre Olalia to excuse me." (As an aside, I also sent a message to Grace Saguinsin explaining my non-attendance. I told Grace my inner fear: That Kissack might give up the ghost). He laughed and said, "Aye, I will outlive you."

The next time I saw him on June 30, he was comatose in the ICU. I told him, "Wake up. Today, the man you vigorously campaigned for took his oath as President. Change is coming. Let us help Duterte. Wake up and pay your dues to your children. Watch them grow up. Wake up. There is still a lot we need to do." His partner, Shen, exclaimed weeping, "Look, his tears are rolling." I really hope he heard me.

I am physically alive. Kissack is now a cold, hard body which will be cremated at 9:30 AM tomorrow. But he is a memory, too. He is a beautiful, powerful memory that will indeed outlive me. The things we do for the weak and oppressed in the name of justice, the things we do for humanity will stay in the memory of the present and the future---bigger than us, more than us. They will inspire people, they will inspire movements. Today. Tomorrow. They will change the world.

Today, we say our final goodbyes to him.

Au revoir, Atty. Kissack Gabaen, President, National Union of Peoples Lawyers-Baguio. Long shall you live.

A LETTER ON DUTERTE FROM A FRIEND IN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND MY RESPONSE

Now, I can reveal this.

Last 24 March 2016, a month after I wrote my Why Rody Duterte article which would eventually become viral, I received an email from a friend expressing his disconcert over my support for Rody Digong Duterte.

My friend is an Amnesty International leader based in the USA who, along with some others I count as friends, has been working indefatigably on human rights issues in the Philippines for decades dating as far back as the Martial Law Years. These people put up the Ecumenical Advocacy Network on the Philippines (EANP). Among the members are Prof. Tim McGloin and his wife, Linda, Prof. Paul Bloom of Amnesty International and his wife Meg Layese who is also President of the Philippine Study Group of Minnesota, Gary King who is Group 37 Leader of Amnesty International, Brian Campbell, and John Sifton of Human Rights Watch. I know how sincere and dedicated EANP is in watching actions of the US government that have an impact on human rights in the Philippines.

In 2013, I joined them in lobbying the US Congress to reduce if not eliminate its aid to the Armed Forces of the Philippines because of human rights violations the AFP committed -by itself or through paramilitaries- especially against indigenous and environmental activists. They asked me to articulate indigenous issues to offices of Representatives and Senators of the US Congress which I did. The efforts of EANP paid off. This was the same group that asked the Lantos Commission to look into the human rights record of the Arroyo administration with the same call to review the military aid. Hearings were conducted by the Commission. Since 2012, the group has been lobbying that the Commission would convene again to look into the human rights record of the Philippines and to give a critical look into its military aids to the government. They also sent Pres. Aquino a signed petition published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer to stop the X-strata Mining in Tampakan. On my request, they sent a letter to the Korean government to stop the Korean Exim Bank from lending P9B for the Jalaur Megadam Project which would displace the indigenous Jalaudnon-Bukidnon. Because of this and efforts of the mass movement of which Jey Aye Alenciaga, John Warner Carag, and Malaya Pinas are part, a fact-finding mission was launched to look into the concerns of the affected indigenous community. They also worked to stop the possibility of Pres. Aquino being given the Nobel.

I am so proud to have been working with EANP and hope to continue doing so in the future.

Anyway, my friend must have been very disappointed in me when he learned I was supporting the Mayor of Davao City. This was his email:

Chyt, I thank you for the plan about a counter-petition to prevent ‘injustice’ in the case of Palparan. He clearly has been a monster, and has motivated many persons in the military, paramilitary and government to torture, murder, (and) (d)isappear people.

I have sent it to my usual 250 friends who do Amnesty International work on the Philippines. Numerous ones have told me they signed the petition you sent.

I have heard you support Duterte. We know about 800 persons murdered by the Davao Death Squads. And he made horrid statements in the past endorsing and promoting it. Conceivably, this rate of murder is comparable to the sins of Palparan himself. And then they started in Cebu City, another 200 murdered.

Has Duterte said anything of repentance, and a desire to deliver law and order without EJE? If there is no change of his heart, I fear he will allow paramilitary groups to thrive, and death squads will proliferate.

Why can we expect these things to diminish under Duterte?

Warm Regards,

xxx”

As soon as I read the mail, I replied:

Hi, Xxxx,

How are you?

We really do find ourselves in a difficult position. I do support Duterte and I am not the only one from the left... I must be breaking your hearts but do hear me out.

We are aware of Duterte's HR record. We will always condemn him for that and will continue trying to make him account. But we are also aware- and have personal knowledge-- that he has a track record of supporting sectors we represent. I do know that he has been supporting the Lumads and has always been one with them in rejecting corporate plunder of indigenous resources. There are almost a thousand evacuees in the UCCP Haran Compound right now. They were internally displaced by the AFP and paramilitaries acting for extractive corporations, some of which are supporting Roxas. Duterte and his family are very protective of the Lumads. Sr. Stella Matutina, the Redemptorist nun given a German recognition for her HR work last year, told me that Duterte's family are giving logistical support to the evacuees and have been rallying local business to contribute to their daily needs. This was confirmed by Cong. Karlos Ysagani Zarate of Bayan Muna and other Mindanao fellow HR workers. What is more, he has consistently opposed US military presence in Mindanao and rejected drone testing. And only he has a clear stand on the coco levy funds--give them to the farmers.

The other candidates do not have the same positions; neither a heart for IPs and basic sectors whose issues we passionately stand for and feel strongly about. Roxas is too oligarchic and too pro-mining. Binay is too corrupt which Duterte is not known to be. Poe is supported by Danding Cojuangco. She already announced she would make Col Ariel Querubin, a San Miguel officer, a cabinet official. She said she would open the Philippine economy to foreign ownership. She promised to appoint PNoy as anti-corruption czar. Claims that she is PNoy's other anointed is not hard for me to believe.

Duterte did kill hundreds. This is not right. But at least- and this is not to defend him-- he did not kill activists from the left unlike Palparan. His death squads do not touch the progressive groups. He seems to limit his bloodlust to his perceived criminals. We fear Duterte's death squad but what about PNoy's and the mining sector's paramilitaries? I believe Roxas will not deviate from PNoy's policy on paramilitaries. Shall I support Binay just because he has no paramilitaries? Shall I support Poe for the same reasons?

Moreover, since the 1990s, Duterte has been working with labor organizations (though I do note what he said about KMU). He is actually credited for many Davao initiatives on women, LGBT, children, and other vulnerable sectors. And it is a fact that he donated an inherited property to the government for the construction of a children's hospice. I know people who attest to his simplicity. Yes, he is a man of contradictions: a man with an iron fist but he is also a man with a soft heart.

For me, personally, choosing to support Duterte was not an easy one to make. I cannot vote for the three others. I have hopes that Duterte will make life less harsh for the Lumads and ease the country from corporate stranglehold. I could be wrong. But I have hopes that this man, despite his flawed character, is not as bad a choice as the others.

“I hope you understand my decision.

Find here my statement issued last February explaining why I decided to go for Duterte. I entertained the idea beginning 2013 when it looked like only he was speaking for the Lumads, and while my mind was then made up, I was ready to be flexible should a better or less bad candidate run. The alternatives then were Roxas and Binay. None of the above. Poe? No , because I have not heard her say anything about IPs. In my statement below, I spared Poe from diatribes out of respect for others in the progressive left who support her.

Best regards,

Chyt

Well, Duterte won by a landslide. I still have to hear from my friend. I know he will never stop fighting to protect human rights in the Philippines and other parts of the world. I know EANP will never rest.

Here I am, very elated that my candidate won. Those days of speaking in caucuses and rallies and other meetings to promote Duterte’s candidacy have contributed even if little to Duterte’s victory. For that, I, as the millions of others who fought for his candidacy despite all odds, claim the right to be part of his conscience, to speak out when he deviates from respect for human rights, and to stand by him when he eases the burden of the impoverished, toiling masses.

I have high hopes in the incoming presidency. I, however, do not believe that elections will fundamentally change things. The mass movement, the different sectors, and the new President must work together to dismantle the oppressive structures.

I hope my friend will eventually tell me, “Chyt, you made the right choice.”

THE UDHR AND THE ICCPR VERSUS THE ACHPR

By CHERYL L. DAYTEC

“Human beings’ natures are alike; it is their habits that separate them.”

                                                       -Confucius

                                                                

          The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  (ICCPR) differ from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on the matter of the duties they impose on individual rights holders. The differences are:

1.     Both the UDHR and the ICCPR  declare that individuals have duties but opted to be silent on what these duties are, while the African Charter enumerates them.

2.     The UDHR and ICCPR state   that    duties of individuals are owed to  the community, and, under the   latter,  to other individuals,  while the African Charter is specific that individuals have duties to  their “fellow beings,” the family and specifically the parents, society, the State, other legally recognized communities and the international community.

3.     The UDHR and ICCPR suggest that states impose   on human beings  duties to others and to  the community to ensure an environment conducive   to  the full enjoyment of individual human rights indicative of an individualist view. The ACHPR creates  individual duties to promote the interest of peoples, states and societies evidencing a communitarian view.   

What explains the differences? To be very sure, the UDHR and the ICCPR are documents applicable to the entirety of the globe, a conglomeration of states of  diverse  peoples and cultures. Thus the  language on duties was deliberately   couched in general terms to grant states room  to determine those duties appropriate or relevant  to their contexts.  On the other hand, the ACHPR is limited to Africa, a region comprised of states whose respective political, economic and cultural landscapes, though each distinct,   are similar. Logically,  its drafting was  influenced by the region’s  material circumstances. The strong emphasis  on individuals’ duties  to the state and society to foster national and regional unity may be impelled by the   imperative to consolidate power against any form of colonial domination in either its old or new configuration, i.e. neocolonialism. It  is significant  to note that the states parties were relatively newly emergent from the cocoon of colonial bondage when they ratified the Charter. To advocates of realism, this polemic  is reasonable. States will always act in their interest.

The question is whether or not these differences suggest different understandings of the nature of human right. There is  a  strong bedrock for the conclusion that the UDHR and ICCPR, on one hand, and the ACHPR, on the other, understand the nature of  rights differently. For one thing, the ICCPR and UDHR regard the individual as the “be-all and end-all” of rights inherent in human nature, reflective of a naturalist approach. This is clear from the rhetoric of  ICCPR  which states that “(e)veryone  has duties  to the community on  which alone the free and full development of his (sic) personality is possible.”[i] The maintenance of a just society will  guarantee the enjoyment of  individual rights, as in the discourse  of John Locke articulated by Shestack.  Having emerged from a social compact, the state now vested with  police, eminent domain and taxation powers must  send its apparatuses working to cloister from any form of assault the rights to life, liberty and property which human beings resolved not to alienate to it. In short, the state exists to promote individual rights.  

 The ACHPR views  collectives (e.g. states,  societies and peoples) as the ultimate beneficiaries of any rights regime. Individuals’ rights must be respected to the extent that they result in the realization of a collective identity (e.g. as a people, or as Africans)   and of collective aspirations which may be interpreted to mean the State’s interest. On this score, the approach resembles the Marxist slant which subordinates individual  interests to the collective’s. 

Also worth noting is that the ICCPR and UDHR  contain  derogation and limitation clauses,[ii]  while the ACHR has none which exposes human rights to susceptibility of  erosion by states as feared by Buergenthal. The absence of provisions as to  the extent of derogation or limitation of rights demonstrates  a positivist approach to human rights. Rights are legal constructs that derive their breath and  reason d’etre  from  states. Necessarily, the power to grant carries with it the power to withhold.  This approach consigns rights to the ideological temperaments of those whose hands are hoisting  the  power trident.

But the ACHPR may be regarded as  a bipolar document,  or a knife that cuts  both ways. After all, it has strong guarantees for individual rights as much as it has strong orders for duties. At  best, the protection or violation  of human rights is left to the proclivities, reason and/or sympathies of  individuals given the mandate to interpret its provisions.  To the African peoples, it can be either a blessing or a curse, or both.

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[i] Art. 29(1)

[ii] Arts. 4, 5,  8(2), 6(2,3,6), 10(2a),  12(3), 14(1), 18(3), 19(3), 21, 22(2,3),  and (29 (2) of ICCPR and  Art. 29(2) of UDHR.

MARGIN OF APPRECIATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

by: CHERYL L. DAYTEC

        Litigation is fallible. As the satirist Ambrose Bierce defined it, it is “a machine which you go into as a pig and come out of as a sausage.” Yet, in dealing with difficult issues involving human rights  calling for political judgment, it is still the best adversarial process there is, short of a revolution or political upheaval. None superior or less inferior to it has been contrived yet.

The adoption by the Strasbourg organs of the doctrine of  margin of appreciation  is not so much  an acknowledgment that “litigation is not the best procedure for dealing with matters of political judgment”[1] as it is a recognition of the fact that it is vulnerable  to flaws. Supranational bodies concerned with international human rights adjudication are confronted with similar  issues  with similar if not identical factual backdrops involving various  states.  Yet, this does not mean that they will  resolve all  cases by the same token. It may happen that  the political, socio-economic or cultural substructures of  similar issues raised against states are  each peculiar on its own.  To treat these unequally circumstanced states equally  is to discriminate.

Having said this, I agree  that “decisions about human rights are not a technical exercise in interpreting texts, but judgments about political morality.”[2] As a general rule, in exercising judicial review, it is not the province of courts to inquire into the wisdom of acts of sovereignty, otherwise they end up supplanting it.  But to observe metes and bounds set by the   political question doctrine  which is a bar to interpretation in domestic settings  is to give states an argument with which to legitimize human rights abuses. The obvious compromise is the application of the  margin of appreciation doctrine under which  supranational courts will scrutinize the necessity of the use of  a coercive measure or the derogation from obligations  or limitation of fundamental rights by states on the basis of the political morality thereof.

If decisions were about legal hermeneutics, supranational bodies can just pull the wool over their  eyes and invoke the doctrine of stare decisis.  In principle,  this doctrine is not controlling but in practical terms, there is nothing that stops them from citing precedents. Considering the volume of decided cases,  texts of human rights conventions have  been  construed in every possible way. Interpretations that may appear conflicting  lend credence to the fact that human rights conventions are living instruments.  Their interpretations insofar as   balancing  polarities created by  divergent interests in  a political community is evolving   with  the socio-political milieu. They are much  larger   than their  texts. Beyond cavil then, international human rights adjudication is not about expertise in text interpretation  because expertise cannot  be achieved when the meaning of a text is  ambulant, i.e.,  it is never final. What may be mastered is the science or art of judging the political morality of acts of states involving the use of coercive power.

In deferring to a state’s political judgment on a matter involving sensitive cultural, religious or national issues, a supra-national human rights court must not compromise universal values of morality. This is the lowest level it should go to. Otherwise, it becomes  a toothless body, shaved of its relevance in humanity’s unending struggle  to protect inalienable rights.  As  foundationalists argue,   “political morality is derived from  universal, immutable first principles that can be apprehended by rational reflection,”[3] which is not a faint echo of Yash Ghai’s assertion that human nature is universal, knowable by reason.[4]

For example, a state with a debt-ridden economy needs to generate revenues. After resorting to taxation, the national treasury remains cash-strapped. It has “white elephant” assets, the maintenance of which is further eating a sizable chunk of the national budget. To pave the way for mining as  source of revenue, it  expropriates the remaining  ancestral domains of indigenous peoples over the latter’s objection. The said domains are their source of livelihood, culture base and sacred grounds. Most of indigenous territories have been taken over  by the state in the past for development projects in the name of national interest.   The expected revenues from mining will pay part of the state’s debt and provide the much needed funds for  the state’s operation.  The state offers compensation beyond the properties’  fair market value to the affected peoples.  Is the act of expropriating the indigenous territories  politically moral?

 If I were the supranational court, I would rule that the state’s action is indefensible. Under Art. 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in no case may a people be deprived of their means of subsistence,  an immutable principle. The taking of ancestral lands deprives the indigenous peoples of their means of subsistence. The act is tantamount to  cultural genocide  as indigenous peoples are attached to their land, divorced from which they become culturally extinct. Balanced against the  national interest sought to be served, which may be addressed through the sale of idle assets, the  taking of these peoples’ ancestral domains has far more onerous consequences and is politically immoral, infringing on the non-derogable right to life.   

---

[1] A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrils. Human Rights in Europe. Manchester-New York, Manchester University Press, 1966, p. 190

[2] Ibid., p. 204

[3] Amstutz, Mark. International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics. Lanham: Rowland and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; p. 12

[4] Yash Gai. “Universalism and Relativism: Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating Interethnic Claims” in  21 Cardozo Law Review (1999-2000),  p.1096.

LIMITS TO EXPRESSION UNDER STRASBOURG JURISPRUDENCE (Last of Two Parts)

by: CHERYL L. DAYTEC-YANGOT

There is no democracy without public discourse and no public discourse without freedom of speech, freedom of the media, and freedom of information.[1]

Freedom of  expression comes with duties and responsibilities owed  to truth, to independence, to impartiality, to objectivity, to democracy, and to individual privacy, among others.

Fidelity to truth comes with what Strasbourg calls “the duty  to impart information and ideas on matters of public concern.”[2]  Media should be impartial. In order for them to  generate a democratic culture,  they   should  be neutral observers, “unengaged with events but faithfully recording them.”[3]

The duty to be objective calls on media to express value-judgments- even polemical ones-  standing on facts.[4]  They are   responsible in ensuring  veracity of stories, although “exaggeration or even a degree of provocation is protected.[5] In Bladet Tromso v. Norway,[6]  Strasbourg ruled that it is sufficient  that journalists  “rely on the contents of official reports without having to undertake independent research.”  The minority  however propounded  that to enjoy protection under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, they  must investigate. In  one case, Strasbourg said that media must ensure  accuracy of historical facts since unlike temporal news, there is no urgency in publishing them, [7] in effect elevating  the standard  for responsibility  to scrutinize veracity compared to the standard when they report news, a “perishable commodity.[8]  In another,[9]  it  implied that media have the duty for balanced reportage and to  respect the other side’s  right-of-reply.

Fidelity to democracy demands public watchdogs[10]  to propagate information on matters of public interest or concern[11]  and stimulate  public discussion or spur public debate.[12]  The configuration of people’s political consciousness depends on data received. Democracy is not  just a government where people elect their leaders. It is one where people have adequate information upon which to anchor their political decisions including who to vote for. Knowledge is power. Thus, the  Camden  Principles  declare that  “when people are denied public participation and voice, their issues, experiences and concerns are rendered invisible, and they become more vulnerable to bigotry, prejudice and marginalization.[13]

 Media play a crucial role not only as purveyors of raw facts  but also of informed opinions as suggested in Lingens.[14] By  crystallizing  issues in sound value-judgments, they  aid  the  public to  adopt positions on social issues, enabling them to be part of public discourse, inspiring  dissent to unbridled use of State power, effectively enhancing democracy. Thus, media should create   forums for  public debate.[15]                                                                                                                                                                                          

The minority in Bladet Tromso asserted a negative media responsibility: they should not sacrifice facts “for the commercial gratification of an immediate scoop.” It said that newspapers have the “ordinary obligation to verify factual statements that were defamatory of private individuals,” implying the duty to protect individual privacy.  But the majority judgment, while prizing respect for the rights and reputation of others and  protection of confidential information, stressed that media’s duty “is nevertheless to impart- in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities- information and ideas on all matters of public interest” because “the public also has a  right to receive them.”[16] This suggests that privacy yields to public interest and it is media’s duty to promote it.

Strasbourg stressed that press freedom “affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of ideas and political leaders.”[17]  But “the safeguard…to journalists in relation to reporting on issues of general interest is  subject to the proviso that they were acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism.”[18]

Media must ensure no  confidential  information  leak[19] or  confidential source  disclosures. Source protection  is a  free press premise. Absent such, sources may withhold information germane to public interest for fear of persecution, essentially impeding the public’s right to information.  Thus,  to compel journalists to reveal sources infringed their  right.[20] Essentially, this was reiterated in Sanoma Uitgevers BV v The Netherlands[21] but  Strasbourg modified the duty  when it  held that  forcing journalists who exposed illegal car races and edited photographs for source  anonymity to produce the CD-ROM  storing the original photographs was above-board because it was intended to identify a vehicle used in a grave felony irrelevant to the illegal race. It said that States may balance conflicting interests served by crime prosecution against protection of sources.

As a consciousness purveyor, media have pervasive public influence. Thus it is incumbent upon them not to use freedom of expression without self-restraint to advocate racism,[22]  violence,[23] totalitarianism[24]  or  corruption of the young’s morals.[25]

Indubitably, freedom of expression is not a license. It is a right that comes with a twin: responsibility.

---

[1] Dieter Grimm, “Freedom of Speech in a Globalized World”  in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, (Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, eds.,  2009).

[2]Observer   v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 59, Series A no. 216, and  Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239); Castels v Spain, 4 EHRR 445 (1992);  Lingens v. Austria,  8  EHRR 407 (1988).

[3] Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary, Application no. 37374/05 (14 April 2009).

[4] Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 EHHR 839 (No. 2), 1997; De Haes v. Belgium,  25 EHRR 11 (1997).

[5] Prager v. Austria (26 April  1995).

[6] Application No. 21980/93 (20 May 1999).

[7] Times Newspapers  (Nos. 1 and 2) v UK , Application No. 3002/03 and 23676/03, (10 March 2009).

[8] Id.

[9]  Tidende v. Norway, 2000 EHRR  305 (2 May 2000).  

[10] Traditionally, mass media were regarded as the public watchdogs. But contemporary Strasbourg jurisprudence says that even organizations outside of the mainstream media, like civil society organizations and non-government organizations are also public watchdogs. See  Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary, Application no. 37374/05 (14 April 2009).

[11] Goodwin v. United Kingdom, Application No.  16/1994/463/544 (27 March 1996).

[12] Steel and Morris v UK , Application No. 68416/01 (15 February 2005).

[13] Introductory Statement, The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality.

[14] Lingens v. Austria,  8  EHRR 407 (1988).

[15] Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary, Application no. 37374/05 (14 April 2009).

[16] Id.

[17] Lingens v. Austria,   8  EHRR 407 (1988).

[18] Bergens Tidende et alis v  Norway,  2000 EHRR  305 (2 May 2000) ;  Stoll v. Switzerland (2007) ECHR 69698/01;  Fressoz and Roire v. France (GC), Application No. 29183/95 (21 January 1999).

[18] Jersild v. Denmark, Application No. 15890/88, ECHR, Ser. A, No. 298  (1995).

[19] See Article 10, European Convention on Human Rights. 

[20] Goodwin v. UK, Application No.  16/1994/463/544 (27 March 1996); reiterated in Szabadsagjogokert v. Hungary,  Application no. 37374/05 (14 April 2009).

[21] Application No. 38224/03  (31 March 2009)

[22] Jersild v. Denmark, Application No. 15890/88, ECHR, Ser. A, No. 298  (1995). In this case, however, the court found a violation in the imposition of penalties for the broadcast of racist views because the broadcast was only for  exposition, and not given as views of the journalist or broadcaster.

[23] Leroy v. France, Application No. 36109/03 (2 October 2008)

[24] B.H., M.W., H.P. and G.K. v Austria, Application No. 12774/87 (12 October 1989)

[25] Handyside v.   UK, Application No. 5493/72  (7 December 1976).