Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts

MARITAL INFIDELITY: TO PUNISH OR NOT TO PUNISH (Part II of two parts)

 By CHERYL L. DAYTEC


(The contents of this  paper were  presented during a policy session with officers of the Department of Social Welfare and Development facilitated by Atty. Germaine Trittle Leonin. The session was intended to come out with an output for consideration by the Congress of the Philippines. )


D. Practice of Other States

Among Western countries, it is only in the United States where marital infidelity is a crime. In 21 States, it is either a misdemeanor, a crime punishable with incarceration for one year or less,  or a felony which is punished more than a misdemeanor.

Most of the States that still maintain penal laws against marital infidelity   are those where the dominant religion is Islam, and Sub-Saharan African Christian-majority countries. Among non-Muslim countries in Asia, it is only  Taiwan and the Philippines which define marital infidelity as a crime. There is of course the peculiar case of India where adultery may be committed only by a man who engages in sex with the wife of another man who did not consent to the act.[1] Although facially, it is discriminatory against men, it is also substantially degrading to women as it treats them as their respective husbands’  property. A husband can consent to his wife’s adultery and she will not incur any criminal liability.

There is now a pending bill in the House of Representatives authored by Gabriela party-list representatives Luz Ilagan and Emmi de Jesus which seeks to amend the Revised Penal Code by erasing  the distinctions between concubinage and adultery and  making marital infidelity a crime of  husbands and wives. What is sauce for the gander must be sauce for the goose.

On the other hand, the UN Working Group on Discrimination against women in law and in practice has issued a call to Governments to repeal laws criminalizing adultery.[2]


A.  Arguments For The Enactment of a Gender-Neutral Law Penalizing Marital Infidelity

1.    The current criminal laws in the Philippines on marital infidelity reinforce gender inequality and promote misogyny. Proof of sexual intercourse is enough in adultery, but in concubinage, the prosecution must prove that the sexual intercourse was under scandalous circumstances, or that the husband kept a mistress in the conjugal dwelling or cohabited with her in any other place. The penalty for concubinage is lower than that of adultery. The penalty for the concubine is only destierro, while the penalty for the “other man” in adultery is the same as that for the guilty wife. To erase this discrimination, the law must be amended to treat men and women equally.

2.    The sex-based discrimination in the  treatment of marital infidelity under the Revised Penal Code violates the equal protection clause of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. III) taken together with Sec. 2,  Art. II which  provides that “(t)he State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.”

3.    The amendment of the Revised Penal Code to incorporate a gender-neutral provision penalizing marital infidelity is mandated by Sec. 12 of RA 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women (MCW) which directs  the amendment or repeal of laws that are discriminatory to women.

4.    The Philippines ratified the Convention on all Forms of Discrimination Against Women which is therefore part of its domestic law under the incorporation doctrine[3] in the Constitution. Article 2(g) of CEDAW requires the State to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women. Article 15 of CEDAW provides:  “States parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.” Article 16 provides that “States parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women…(t)he same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution.”

5.    The Philippines also ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and is part of its domestic law. It is in keeping with the ICCPR to adopt a gender-neutral criminal law on marital infidelity. Article 23 of the ICCPR provides: “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.”

6.    The Family Code of the Philippines (EO 209, as amended) provides  marital infidelity as a ground for legal separation. It makes no distinction whether the one who breached the marital trust is the husband or the wife. To harmonize the Family Code with the Revised Penal Code, Arts. 333 and 334 of the latter must be accordingly amended.

7.    The discrepancy  between the treatment of infidelity by the wife and  the infidelity by the husband  has been legally and judicially justified in US v. Mata[4] as necessary to prevent “the danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, whereby the rights of the real heirs may be impaired and a man may be charged with the maintenance of a family not his own.”[5] With the advancement and progress in science and technology which has made DNA tests available, it is now easy to establish the paternity of a child a woman may give birth to. The philosophical underpinning of or spirit behind the discrimination has disappeared. There is no reason to maintain it in law. When the spirit disappears, so must the letter of the law.

B.    Arguments Against The Enactment of a Gender Neutral Infidelity Penal Law

According to the UN Working Group on women, “Criminal law definitions of adultery may be ostensibly gender neutral and prohibit adultery by both men and women. However, closer analysis reveals that the criminalization of adultery is both in concept and practice overwhelmingly directed against women.”[6]  In societies like the Philippines where patriarchy rules  and where social norms still regard the husband’s infidelity as an affirmation of his macho image and the wife’s infidelity as an affirmation of her image as a whore or vampire (if she is not a virgin or a Madonna), a facially gender-neutral law will be enforced in a discriminatory way.


C.   Arguments for the  Decriminalization
of Adultery and Concubinage

1.       The current laws on marital infidelity reinforce gender inequality and misogyny which expose women to more vulnerabilities and risks. According to the United Nations Working Group on discrimination against women in law and in practice, “maintaining adultery as a criminal offense, even when it applies to both women and men, means in practice that women mainly will continue to face extreme vulnerabilities, and violation of their human rights to dignity, privacy and equality.”[7]  This is because as earlier pointed out, the enforcement a law, which is gender-neutral in literal expression, in a society where women are still regarded inferior will be discriminatory.  By decriminalizing adultery, the State eliminates such risks and vulnerabilities to further discrimination.

2.    The criminalization of infidelity is an invitation of too much government interference into the personal lives of people including on matters that should be dealt with privately .It  obviously represents State overreach into people’s private lives. It  is indubitably  a violation of  the right to privacy which is protected by the Constitution.

3.    The Philippines ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which is therefore part of its domestic law under the incorporation doctrine[8] in the Constitution. Under Art. 17 of the ICCPR, it is provided: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation…Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” International human rights jurisprudence established that criminalization of sexual relations between consenting adults is a violation of their right to privacy and infringement of article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[9] States parties to the Covenant are obliged to ensure that domestic norms take account of developments in international law and incorporate interpretations of the decisions of international courts and international and regional human rights mechanisms, including the treaty bodies and special procedures.[10]

4.    Adultery/concubinage involves a breach of trust and commitment of fidelity “until death do us part”  and is therefore a breach of   a marriage contract; thus, liability for dishonoring the contract should  be civil in form and substance  and not criminal.[11] Decriminalization respects the free will and autonomy of the spouses to determine whether to remain  married. Such decision should not be imposed by the State through a penal law.  Maintaining trust and fidelity in a marriage should not be enforced through the threat of criminal prosecution and punishment. It should be the product of negotiation by the spouses since after all one of the essential requisites of marriage is consent freely given by them..[12]

5.    The penalization of marital infidelity is an undue exercise of police power. While through police power, the State may regulate liberties, the purpose of such regulation must be the common good. What common good is realized when a philandering wife or husband  is put to jail?

6.    Decriminalization does not necessarily leave the aggrieved spouse without recourse. S/he can file an action for legal separation. If the infidelity is  serial and inveterate and of such nature that it manifests psychological incapacity, the aggrieved spouse may go to court to file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. S/he may also file an action for civil damages. In case the aggrieved is a wife, she may file a criminal action and/or a civil case based on Republic 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.

7.    The criminalization of marital infidelity has not been shown to contribute to the preservation  of  marriage and  has not been demonstrated  to deter infidelity. For instance, despite penalizing marital infidelity from 1953 until very recently to protect women from divorce to which they were vulnerable owing to their lower status than men, South Korea witnessed its  divorce rate shoot up in the last 15 years and is now among the highest in Asia.[13] Note that non-Muslim Asian countries, with the exception of Taiwan and the Philippines, do not penalize marital infidelity.  How come South Korea has raced ahead of them in divorce rates?

8.    Gabriela Women's Party-List’s   records reveal that criminal complaints for adultery and concubinage are filed in practice as "bargaining suits" or leverage to make the other spouse cooperate in the action to dissolve the marriage or to capitulate to demands for support.[14] These complaints are not brought to their logical conclusion since, “while pursued in the initial stages, (they) are often withdrawn or dismissed.”[15] According to statistics, married people resort to court action more to dissolve their marital unions than to seek penal  vindication of adultery or concubinage.[16] If this is the case, then the law criminalizing adultery and concubinage which may be initiated at the instance of the offended party, does not serve its purpose or has been rendered functus officio. So why maintain it in the statute books?

9.       States’ practice indicates the abandonment of infidelity as a criminal offense on the belief that it is their obligation to do it under international law or in honor of individual privacy rights. The recognition of marital infidelity as a non-criminal offense by many members of the international community  might have ripened into customary international law. All the Western countries have decriminalized adultery, with the exception of the United States where adultery is still penalized in 21 States.[17] In Asia, only the Philippines and Taiwan among non-Muslim countries still penalize marital infidelity.[18] Those decriminalizing it are justifying their actions invoking treaty obligations or constitutional limitations.

10. Many of the arguments against decriminalization are based on religious dogmas which the State, as  a secular entity, need not enforce.

D.   Arguments Against Decriminalization

1.       Decriminalization destroys the nature of ”marriage (a)s a special contract and a three-party agreement that involves the husband, the wife and the State.” This means “that although the personal rights of the spouses are involved in cases of infidelity, the State also considers itself as an offended party, not because of a breach of public order but because of the violation of marital vows which the State itself protects.“[19]

2.       “Striking them (adultery and concubinage) off the catalogue of crimes will send the message to Philippine society that now, sexual liaisons  and dalliances with persons other than with one’s spouse are now allowed? How can such a legislative proposal ‘protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution?’[20]

3.    “Under our VAWC Law--passed as domestic legislation in response to international covenants, the CEDAW as well as the CRC among them--we consider violence not only physical but psychological cruelty. What can be more cruel for a spouse than to have the other sexually engaged with another and entering into intimate liaisons with another? How can it serve legal coherence for us to de-criminalize under one title what we consider criminal cruelty and violence under another?”[21]

4.     Decriminalization is a public health issue. Without a law criminalizing marital infidelity, married people may be wont to be unfaithful and may acquire Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs).  Since most married couples do not routinely use barrier contraceptives,  innocent spouses may be infected with STD.


E.     Policy Proposals

1.    Adultery and concubinage should be decriminalized for reasons explained in the arguments in its favor. Although there are arguments against it, these are parried by the arguments supporting it. Other arguments border on the absurd and stand on their own demerit.

2.    However, as a companion to the repeal of the marital infidelity provisions of the Revised Penal Code, there is a need to  enact a divorce law that paves  a way out for people trapped in marriages debased or perverted by marital infidelity. The two remedies —annulment and declaration of nullity- available to people seeking marital dissolution  address only issues of validity and nullity of the marriage. Infidelity is not a validity issue. While it is a ground for legal separation, this is an insufficient remedy for the aggrieved spouse as it does not sever the marital ties.  Infidelity is an indication that a foundation of marriage which is trust or fidelity is disappearing or is no longer present. The marriage may no longer exist except in name only. Divorce must be made available to dissolve the marriage.

3.    In order to settle concerns that the decriminalization of adultery and concubinage will encourage or abet licentious sexual lifestyle on the part of married people, marital infidelity should be treated as a matrimonial offense and be meted out civil penalties in proceedings for legal separation or divorce. Thus,   in the determination of custody of children, division of properties, or support in the event of legal separation or divorce, a spouse’s infidelity should be factored in. As marital infidelity will still produce adverse legal consequences short of criminal punishment, spouses may be deterred from committing it.




[1] Gangothri.org, Adultery: Indian Legal Perspective, 10 April 2013. Retrieved from http://www.gangothri.org/?q=node/6; See also, Sec. 497 of the Indian Penal Code. (Whoever  has sexual intercourse with a person who is and  whom he  knows or  has reason  to believe  to be  the wife  of another man,  without the  consent or  connivance of  that  man,  such sexual intercourse  not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence  of adultery,  and shall  be punished with imprisonment of either description  for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or  with both.  In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.”)
[2] See,  “Joint Statement by the United Nations Working Group on discrimination against women in law and in practice” of 18 October 2012, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12672&LangID=E.
[3] The 1987 Philippine Constitution states as one of its principles, as follows:
 Section 3. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
[4] G.R. No. L-6300, 2  March  1911. 
[5] Evans v. Murff, 135 F. Supp. 907, 911 (1955)
[6] Supra n. 2.
[7] Id.
[8] Supra n. 3.
[9] Supra n. 2.
[10] Id.
[11] Rep. Emmi De Jesus, during the House of Representatives Committee on Revision of Laws Meeting on 17 March 2015, in The Pros And Cons Debate: Should RPC Article 333 on Adultery & Article 334 on Concubinage Be Amended or Repealed? (Author unknown) (On file with author)
[12] See Art. 2, Family Code of the Philippines.
[13] Supra, n. 12.

[14] Dionisio P. Tubianosa, Repeal discriminatory provisions on extra marital affairs in the Revised Penal Code, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, 27 May 2014. Accessed from: http://congress.gov.ph/press/details.php?pressid=7894.

[15] Id.
[16] Rep. Barry Gutierrez, House of Representatives Committee on Revision of Laws Meeting, 17 March 2015, in The Pros And Cons Debate: Should RPC Article 333 on Adultery & Article 334 on Concubinage Be Amended or Repealed? (Author unknown) (On file with author)

[17]New Hampshire Senate votes to repeal anti-adultery law,  accessed from: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/04/17/anti-adultery-laws-new-hampshire/7780563/.

18] In  Indian law, adultery may be committed only by a man who engages in sex with the wife of another man who did not consent to the act. See, Gangothri.org, Adultery: Indian Legal Perspective, 10 April 2013. Retrieved from http://www.gangothri.org/?q=node/6. See also, Sec. 497 of the Indian Penal Code (stating, "Whoever  has sexual intercourse with a person who is and  whom he  knows or  has reason  to believe  to be  the wife  of another man,  without the  consent or  connivance of  that  man,  such sexual intercourse  not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence  of adultery,  and shall  be punished with imprisonment of either description  for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or  with both.  In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.")

[19] Philippine Commission on Women, Policy Brief No. 3, Addressing the Inequality in our Penal Law on Adultery and Concubinage: Enacting The Anti-Marital Infidelity Law. See also, Domini M. Torrevillas,  “Amending the marital infidelity law,” From The Stands, The Philippine Star,  June 30, 2015, accessed from: http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2015/06/30/1471565/amending-marital-infidelity-law

[20] Catholic Bishop Conference of the Philippines, accessed through
http://cbcpwebsite.com/Messages/divorce.html)
[21] Id.

VICE-PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: A MYTH MOTHERED BY JUSTICE SECRETARY DE LIMA

by: CHERYL L. DAYTEC

Justice Secretary Leila de Lima reportedly issued a statement that the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines enjoys immunity from suit during his incumbency  as the President does. She declared that the immunity applies to all impeachable officials.

The 'short' of my 'long' comment: De Lima is wrong that the Vice President  is immune from suit. If the President is not immune from suit, why should he be? Assuming the President is immune, the traditional reason for it -that he may be unimpeded in the exercise of presidential powers-- does not apply to the Vice President who has not one power under the Constitution.

Why should  the  Vice President be immune from suit when, in fact, the 1987 Constitution does not even state that the President who is higher than him, is?There has to be a reason why presidential immunity textually expressed in the 
1973 Constitution was dropped from the 1987 Constitution which however retained the provision on non-suability of the State enshrined in the previous Constitution. Presidential immunity  was a legal creation of Pres. Ferdinand Marcos. When his regime repudiated the 1935 Constitution in place of a new Constitution, he ensured that there would be a provision granting himself immunity from suit. Thus, Art. VII, Section 7 of the 1973 Constitution provided:  "The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit or whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure."

Presidential immunity  positioned Marcos above the law.In a functioning democracy, no one is above the law. No one is above the law, not even the President, especially not the President who, under a presidential system like that of the Philippine Government, must ensure the faithful implementation of the laws.

The Marcos regime, to this very day, is internationally known for having been a government of men and women and not of laws. Rule of law was repudiated in the name of an oppressive dictatorship. There is no need to be apocryphal about the consequences of presidential immunity from suit.

In 1986, Marcos was ousted during the so-called People Power Revolution. Having learned its lessons, the Filipino people newly emergent from the cocoon of tyranny, sought to dismantle legal structures that desecrated the rule of law and put a few self-proclaimed leviathans above it. One way of realizing this was by hurling presidential immunity  into the dustbins of history.

Thus, in the 1987 Constitution, there is already a very conspicuous absence of any provision to the effect that the President is immune from suit. It was the intent of the Filipino people, regardless of the intent of the constitutional drafters, to make the President of the Philippines accountable before the law. Accountability is a constitutional watchword under Section 1 of Article XI and is inherent in a functioning democracy. After all, the President is the chief implementor of laws. This becomes meaningless when, while he hoists the trident to enforce laws, he may not be made accountable while he sits when he violates them.

It is worth noting that the few decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court recognizing presidential immunity  under the 1987 Constitution  are friable. Its very tenacity  was discussed  in the case of  Soliven, et. al.v. Judge Makasiar, where the Court stated that  "(t)he rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being a Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention." Yet, Soliven disproved its own point. In this case, then President Corazon Aquino  sued journalist Louie Beltran for libel occasioned by the latter's report that she hid under the bed at the height of a coup d’ etat against her administration. This suggestion of being a lameduck President so enraged Ms Aquino that she dragged her accuser to court. She was not denied access to the courts. And why should she? She was also a citizen subject to the same rights and obligations as the next citizen. At any rate, the point here is that under the doctrine of necessary implications, if the President can institute complaints under the spirit of the Constitution, s/he may also be made to respond to complaints. And if s/he can sue while President, then his/her attention gets divided. Soliven thus allows the President's attention to be divided, which immunity seeks to prevent.

David v Arroyo's pronouncement on presidential immunity was merely an obiter dictum (or a "by the way" comment, for those who are not familiar with legal gobbledygook) but it would be cited later in Lozada v. Arroyo. Regardless of this, the Supreme Court in Davide  relied on the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Mississippi v. Johnson. This case was decided in the 1866 when the United States of America was engaged in a civil war which required that the President should not be distracted. To invoke this decision as a precedent is absurd considering that the exigencies obtaining in the United States at the time Mississippi was promulgated are not obtaining, even remotely, in the Philippines at present.

Philippine jurisprudence on presidential immunity is not supported by the Constitution. At the risk of belaboring the point, the textual or literal expression of presidential immunity present in the 1973 Constitution was dropped by the 1987 Constitution, which must be interpreted as abandonment by the people of a provision that could entrench tyranny.

Moreover, the principle of rule of law and the basic tenet that democracy is a government of laws and not of people pervade our Constitution in spirit and must be considered written there. It is also remarkable that the United States on whose Constitution was based the Constitution of the Philippines, abandoned absolute presidential immunity from suit as a doctrine. In 
US v Nixon, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) rejected President Richard Nixon’s  claim of immunity from judicial processes because of executive privilege.

In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a divided SCOTUS  ruled that an absolute presidential immunity for official acts was existing for reasons of public policy. The absence of such immunity "could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment not only of the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve." The immunity according to the doctrine in Nixon applies only to official acts, but not to crimes and other unofficial acts. In Clinton v Jones, the SCOTUS said that a sitting President is not immune from suit for acts committed before election.
 
During his tenure, President George Bush was similarly haled to court. Among cases against him were Boumediene v. Bush, and Rasul v. Bush, both of which involved presidential acts, not private acts. That Nixon, Clinton, and Bush as sitting Presidents were sued and the SCOTUS did not dismiss the cases against them on grounds of immunity as our courts do when the President is in the same boat is a recognition that the US President is not, or is no longer, immune from suit as a rule. 

These are already telling indicia that the SCOTUS  has been departing from the undemocratic notion that the President is immune from suits, parallel to legal developments in other democracies in the world which have since rejected claims of presidential immunity from suit or immunity for heads of governments including presidents and prime ministers.

In the international community, what is currently recognized is immunity of heads of government for purely sovereign acts abandoning an antiquated legal relic that  sovereigns could not be fallible. Discarding presidential immunity merely affirms a basic tenet of democracy: that in democracies, there are no leviathans other than the sovereign people.

Geographically closer to the Philippines is Thailand. Last year, its Constitutional Court purged Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra from office for abuse of power committed when she illegally transferred a civil service servant to another office more than three years ago. Along with the Prime Minister, other members of the cabinet who were in office at the time the transfer was effected were likewise ordered to step down.

For many of the reasons I cited, the National Union of Peoples' Lawyers disagrees that the President is immune from suit. We always implead the President in cases where acts of the Executive Branch are assailed.

Now, even granting that the President is immune from suit, the underpinning reason for the immunity does not obtain in the case of the Vice-President: the President should not be distracted from the exercise of presidential powers.Indeed, the President has many powers under the Constitution. But how many powers does the Vice President have under the Constitution? None at all. S/he is a spare tire for the presidency and that is not a power.When appointed to a Cabinet position, s/he exercises powers as an alter ego of the President but not as VP.

Thus, Justice Secretary De Lima's legal opinion that the  Vice President is immune from suit is so, so flawed. 

NO CONSPIRACY, PLEASE.


By MARK MERUEÑAS, GMA News December 22, 2011 4:25pm


Justice Secretary Leila de Lima on Thursday said it was merely "coincidental" that the funds misuse complaint against Chief Justice Renato Corona's wife began rolling anew at a time when the Chief Justice is to face an impeachment trial next month.

Through her legal counsel, Ma. Cristina Corona on Thursday submitted an 16-page counter affidavit denying any misuse of P170,000 as president and chairman of the John Hay Management Corp (JHMC) from 2008 to 2010.

Mrs. Corona allegedly either charged expenses to JHMC or reimbursed amounts incurred at Camp John Hay in Baguio City.

The complaint against her was filed with the DOJ by former JHMC general manager Frank Daytec in July last year. Daytec migrated to Canada shortly after lodging the complaint. After almost a year and a half since the complaint was filed, the Justice Department carried out a preliminary investigation on the matter.

But De Lima said the timing of the investigation should not be put in question. "If you are implying that I instigated that because of this impeachment, I absolutely and categorically deny that."

"Nagkataon lang na it was set in motion [now] (It so happened that the case was set in motion now)," De Lima said.

After Thursday's preliminary investigation, Daytec's legal counsel and sister Cheryl Daytec said that even if Mrs. Corona failed to reimburse some of the amount in question, "the fact is, she asked for reimbursement and that alone consummates the crime."

Like De Lima, Cheryl said there was no conspiracy in the sudden "revival" of the case.

"It is unfortunate that the investigation coincided with the impeachment case... Besides, hindi nga dapat sabihin 'na-revive' kasi hindi naman namatay ang kaso to begin with (Besides, it is not correct to say that the case was revived because it never died to begin with)," said Cheryl, who denied being part of any political party but said she was an "activist."

But Mrs. Corona insisted on casting doubt on the "suspicious timing of the resurrection" of the complaint against her.

"It does not take much effort to see that this is directly and unequivocally connected to the political pressure by some quarters for my husband... to inhibit from certain cases pending in the Supreme Court or altogether resign from the Court," she said in a statement.

The Chief Justice is scheduled to face an impeachment trial at the Senate in January to answer eight allegations of betrayal of public trust among other charges. He is particularly being criticized for his perceived bias for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who appointed him as chief justice.

Corona has already vowed to face the charges against him even as several individuals including those from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines have asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order, barring the Senate from moving on with the impeachment trial next month.

Mrs. Corona subscribed to her affidavit Thursday morning before Deputy Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon at about 10 a.m. The affidavit was later filed during the preliminary investigation conducted by State Prosecutor Vimar Barcellano. Representing Mr. Daytec was his sister, while Corona was represented by Stanley Fabito.

Lawyer Daytec said their camp was given 15 days to file a manifestation that his brother - complainant Daytec - is willing to return to the Philippines from Canada to testify in case the complaint gets elevated to a trial court. Corona's camp will be given 10 days to comment on the manifestation, and the PI panel will have two months to resolve the complaint. — RSJ, GMA News

ON CJ CORONA'S ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE

Accountability

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“There is no doubt that we are staring at a constitutional crisis right in the face,” said Supreme Court spokesperson Midas Marquez, after the House of Representatives impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona. But on the day Marquez uttered his grave declaration, the Philippine republic seemed none the worse for wear from the supposed titanic and historic crisis it was going through. All three co-equal branches of government continued to operate normally—even the Supreme Court, which, Marquez admitted, would continue to function regularly, despite the impeachment of the Chief Justice.

By sunset of that day, nothing untoward had happened to the state or to its citizens. Whatever large-scale disruption there was would, in fact, occur only the next day—on the Supreme Court’s turf, when Marquez, also the court administrator, enjoined everyone in the judicial branch of government to suspend work for the day to listen to Corona’s speech decrying his impeachment and vowing to cling to his post by hook or by crook. Among the hearings affected by the court suspensions was the Ampatuan massacre trial. Marquez would subsequently deny that he ordered a “court holiday,” but an Iloilo judge said he got the call from Marquez himself.

In any case, nearly the country’s entire judiciary ground to a halt, with employees of Manila salas even trooping to the Supreme Court grounds to cheer as their embattled chief launched a counterattack against President Aquino and his allies in Congress with a sour, caustic peroration that sounded more like a campaign stump speech, and whose main meat—“Handa po akong humarap sa paglilitis”—the courts could have been told about without them having to go on work stoppage. Incidentally, the high court itself has forbidden government personnel from suspending official work to engage in rallies or politically related activities. Surely this counted as one. But for the Chief Justice’s sake, one supposes, a creative reinterpretation of the law was again in order.

The anomalous court holiday derives from the same hubristic mindset that informs the so-called “constitutional crisis” Marquez troubles his head with: the idea that the Supreme Court is Corona, and Corona is the Supreme Court, and any attack on the Chief Justice is therefore also an assault on the Court and the branch of government it heads. “Make no mistake,” said Marquez, “this is an assault not only on the person of Chief Justice Corona, not only on his office, not only on the Supreme Court. This is an assault on all the rights, powers and privileges of the entire judiciary.”

Corona himself, unperturbed by any scintilla of humility or circumspection, has no problem proclaiming that he and the office he holds are indeed one and the same: “I am here. I am not going anywhere. I am your defender and most of all I am your Chief Justice. Together we will face these challenges and fight all who dare to destroy the Court and our system of justice under the Constitution.”

Ah, the Constitution. It’s a good thing Corona mentioned it, because nowhere in that document does it say that any government official becomes one with the office he or she holds, and that that government official may be removed from office only at the risk of damaging the office itself. When President Joseph Estrada was impeached by Congress, did the nation hear him complain that the onslaught against him was “an assault on all the rights, powers and privileges” of the presidency? Even Estrada wasn’t too dumb to claim that. The Constitution, in fact, lays out the opposite spirit. All government officials, whether elected or appointed, are accountable for their actions, and successful enforcement of that accountability—through constitutional offices such as the courts, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan—could only disinfect and strengthen the offices defiled by their wayward personnel.

But, since the Chief Justice can’t be sued in his own court, the Constitution mandates one avenue by which to enforce accountability on him: impeachment. Loud and clear. When hard questions, then, are asked of the nation’s chief magistrate, when he is asked to explain himself on matters where his fairness, impartiality and fidelity to the oath of office he took are perceived to be in doubt, why should that be, necessarily and automatically, an assault on his office and the entire judiciary itself?

Corona’s impeachment is about Corona alone. He and his office are not one and indissoluble. To claim otherwise is the height of delusional conceit.